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Introduction / Chapter 1: The Psychiatric Paradigm and Making-up of 
Schizophrenia 
Scholars and mental health professionals spend a considerable amount of time 
and resources investigating the construction of schizophrenia. This investigation has led 
to intense debates about the nature of the hypothesized disease. Although the construct 
of schizophrenia has been around for over 100 years, much remains a mystery about the 
causes and course of the disorder. Some researchers point towards biological factors, 
while others analyze possible social factors. While the debate rages amongst 
professionals, those suffering from psychotic episodes are forced to take a subsidiary 
role and wait for conclusions. Despite the general scientific assumption that phenomena 
should be studied objectively, when the subject of study is human beings it becomes 
challenging to remain fully objective because subjectivity is critical and intrinsic to the 
human psyche. The voices and experiences of those suffering should not take a back 
seat to expert analysis, but should rather be at the forefront of investigation contributing 
to the collaborative quest for an understanding of suffering. For too long, voices of 
suffering have been silenced. This is especially the case regarding schizophrenia, as 
hearing voices is considered a symptom that should be eradicated. Restricting the voice 
of the subject of study damages the progress of treatment, marginalizes those suffering, 
and consequently perpetuates suffering. In order for treatments of schizophrenia to 
qualitatively progress, research and implementation must not only be executed by 
professionals, but structures must allow voices of suffering to take on a more prominent 
and meaningful role. Thus, the main assumption of this thesis is that the primary role of 
the medical system is to support and empower those who suffer.  
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My investigation will focus on schizophrenia as a case-study for broader 
understanding of suffering. Schizophrenic suffering does not serve as an ultimate model 
for suffering in general, but examining schizophrenia illuminates the expansive and 
personal impacts of suffering. It is also important to explore schizophrenic suffering 
because of its highly enigmatic characteristics that are attached to social stigma. If the 
general population has trouble empathizing and accepts common misconceptions about 
schizophrenia, this helps foster a regressive environment. Many domains influence 
schizophrenia, and I do not have the expertise or experience to analyze all of them. 
However, this analysis will incorporate research into psychological and philosophical 
conceptions related to schizophrenia. I will also incorporate my own experiences of 
consulting professional therapists, and attending meetings with the International Society 
for Psychological and Social Approaches to Psychosis. While I will not be able to 
integrate all domains related to schizophrenic suffering, my approach will explore key 
factors influencing the course of schizophrenia, as well as explore efficient methods for 
recovery and prevention. Currently, the medical domain dominates the conversation 
about views and treatments of schizophrenia. Although the medical domain necessitates 
a role in future progress, the theories, discourse, practices, and institutions used by the 
medical domain must be reevaluated. 
Currently, treatment of schizophrenia is primarily influenced by the psychiatric 
paradigm. Thomas Kuhn (1962) defines a scientific paradigm as the “law, theory, 
application, and instrumentation together— [that] provide models from which spring 
particular coherent traditions of scientific research” (p.10). Paradigms refer to the set of 
foundations and assumptions that guide the progress of research. According to Kuhn, 
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scholars work diligently to solve the problems put forth by a paradigm. Scientific 
discoveries that do not comply with the relative paradigm are often swept under the rug. 
However, if enough contrary discoveries accumulate, then the scientific community can 
be said to be in a state of crisis. This state of crisis is accompanied by heavy resistance 
from supporters of the challenged paradigm. In order for a crisis period to evolve into a 
complete paradigm shift, a new theory must appear that is incommensurable with the 
previous theory. Eventually, the new theory must gain more support than the old theory. 
Although Kuhn’s theory of scientific progress is not perfect, it serves as an 
excellent model to describe the progression of the current psychiatric paradigm. The 
psychiatric paradigm has served as the foundation for schizophrenic treatment for over 
half a century. This paradigm asserts that schizophrenia is a real disease, independent 
from normal human deviance. Despite progress made within the psychiatric paradigm, 
many professionals have critiqued the paradigm for contributing to misconceptions 
about schizophrenia, influencing over diagnosis, and ultimately perpetuating suffering. 
Dissenters claim that in order for a scientific phenomenon to be considered real, it must 
obtain scientific validity and reliability. Validity refers to the independent existence of a 
phenomenon, while reliability refers to the ability to consistently account for the same 
phenomenon through multiple trials. Many dissenters argue that research 
overwhelmingly supports the idea that schizophrenia is neither a valid or reliable 
construct. Ultimately, dissenters have challenged the psychiatric paradigm for many 
years in what could been regarded as a Kuhnian crisis period.  
It is a common misunderstanding to assume that when one asserts schizophrenia 
is not a realdisease, that one believes people are fabricating their suffering. This could 
 4 
 
not be further from the truth. Schizophrenic skeptics believe and acknowledge that 
suffering is all too real. The distinction between skeptics and believers lies in what they 
believe to be the source of suffering. For believers, the source of suffering is due to 
schizophrenia. However, skeptics argue that the labeling of schizophrenia is still 
premature, and that the source of suffering is often due to a multitude of factors. 
Skeptics see the label itself, as a potential layer of suffering. The consequences of 
labeling humans has been studied extensively by Ian Hacking (1999), who argues “that 
numerous kinds of human beings and human acts come into being hand in hand with 
our invention of the categories labeling them” (p.170). Hacking refers to this process as 
making-up-people. Again, this does not infer that people fabricate or make-up their 
suffering, but argues that categories and labels intricately influence people’s 
subconscious, beliefs and actions. Hacking investigates the process of making-up 
multiple personality disorder, but recognizes there can be no general theory of making 
up people as “each category has its own history” (p.168). Therefore, it is important to 
explore the making-up of schizophrenia in order to recognize its consequences and 
create solutions. 
Most importantly, the medical field must realize that a history of over diagnosis 
and misdiagnosis creates ramifications, that harm the individual’s ability to recover. 
This thesis explores the ‘making up’ of schizophrenia and then asks two essential 
questions. First, why is the current psychiatric paradigm in a state of Kuhnian crisis that 
must be resolved? Next, how can the ‘making up’ of schizophrenia be used to empower, 
rather than damage, those who suffer? By investigating schizophrenia and the 
progression of treatments, we see that the schizophrenic label has primarily served a 
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pragmatic function to help psychiatrists efficiently converse about multiple patients. 
Despite its pragmatic value, the current state of America’s mental health system 
reinforces assumptions that are damaging to suffering individuals. This is important 
because if receiving a diagnosis damages an individual’s self-esteem and well-being, 
then the diagnostic system perpetuates suffering. Currently, the medical field diagnoses 
brain diseases primarily based on behavioral symptoms, which ironically ignores 
studying the complex biological properties of the brain and the convoluted structure of 
our society. In order for research and treatment methods to progress, psychiatrists must 
quit hastily diagnosing behaviors, focus on enhancing techniques to find the true source 
of suffering, and create a safe environment that empowers the suffering. 
Roots of the Modern Psychiatric Paradigm and Schizophrenia 
Schizophrenia, the word alone is likely to generate strong emotions with anyone 
impacted by this form of suffering. Whether one is personally impacted or knows 
someone suffering, schizophrenia can become a life altering experience for all involved. 
Yet, there is still much confusion about the nature of this disease. For the American 
general public, schizophrenia is often associated with words such as crazy, psychotic, or 
chemical imbalance. However, these associations only scratch the surface of the reality 
of schizophrenia. This section will aim to explore the progression of the psychiatric 
paradigm and the making-up of schizophrenia. 
The roots of this paradigm can be traced as far back to Ancient Greece or China, 
as the conception of mental illness has been around for at least the past 2,000 years. For 
the sake of focus, I can not trace its entire history. However, the biggest influence to the 
framework used by experts today comes from ideas propagated by European and 
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American societies during the 18th and 19th centuries. For a great portion of history, 
physical or mental illness was considered a result of spirit possession or other abstract 
causes. During the course of the American and European Scientific Revolution, experts 
disregarded old religious beliefs in favor of physiological and psychological causes. 
However, this shift from external religious authority to reductionist medical authority, 
catalyzed drastic consequences for the medical industry and the mentally ill. In 
Whitaker’s novel Mad in America (2002) he explores the progression of the treatment 
of madness in America. He mentions the 1774 passage of legislation in Britain which 
granted physicians “the sole arbiters of insanity” (p.9). Physicians acquired the sole 
authority in determining whether or not someone required life confinement in an 
asylum. This coincided with a significant growth in the medical industry that allowed 
physicians to make a fortune running asylums, which essentially became businesses. 
For example, Whitaker (2002) mentions that asylums “served as convenient dumping 
grounds for relatives who were simply annoying or unwanted…a physician who would 
attest to this fact could earn a nice sum” (p.8-9). This elevation of the status of the 
physician was unparalleled in Western society, and significantly altered the relationship 
between physician and patient.  
Whitaker (2002) describes how Thomas Willis’s influential 1684 text on 
insanity concluded “that the insane were animal-like in kind”, which reflected the 
prevailing conceptions “that reason was the faculty that elevated humankind above the 
animals” (p.6). To say that the mentally-ill were treated harshly would be an 
understatement. Their independence was stripped, as physicians gained authority in 
determining what was best for patients. Common treatment methods included being 
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forcefully strapped to a chair, bleeding, induced vomiting, starvation, and drowning. 
This process exemplifies the creation of an out-group, a group with which individuals 
do not identify. In Aronson et al. (2010), the authors describe the phenomenon of out-
group homogeneity, which is the perception that “those in the out-group [are] more 
similar to each other than they really are, as well as more homogeneous than the in-
group members are” (398). Ramifications of creating out-groups have also been studied 
extensively by scholars including Michel Foucault. In his investigation of madness, 
Madness and Civilization, Foucault (1965) uses the term “great confinement" to argue 
that the detainment of the mad served a political function of suppressing threats to 
social order (p.38). In this sense, hospitals were closer to prisons than services to 
support suffering. This influenced a disconnect between the physician and patient, 
where the physician took on an authoritative role and the patient a subordinate role. 
Although these attitudes have decreased in intensity, the remnants remain. This excerpt 
by Foucault emphasizes how delegating reason to explain madness consequently 
silences the mad. 
“In the serene world of mental illness, modern man no longer 
communicates with the madman: on one hand, the man of reason 
delegates the physician to madness, thereby authorizing a relation only 
through the abstract universality of disease; on the other, the man of 
madness communicates with society only by the intermediary of an 
equally abstract reason which is order, physical and moral constraint, the 
anonymous pressure of the group, the requirements of conformity. As for 
a common language, there is no such thing; or rather, there is no such 
thing any longer; the constitution of madness as a mental illness, at the 
end of the eighteenth century, affords the evidence of a broken dialogue, 
posits the separation as already effected, and thrusts into oblivion all 
those stammered, imperfect words without fixed syntax in which the 
exchange between madness and reason was made. The language of 
psychiatry, which is a monologue of reason about madness, has been 
established only on the basis of such a silence” (x-xi) 
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These negative attitudes toward the mentally ill would set the stage for Emil Kraepelin 
and Eugen Bleuler, two of the biggest influences in the creation of schizophrenia. 
Kraepelin in specific contributed many ideas that influence the modern diagnostic 
paradigm. Progress in medicine during this time period was impressive, but 
psychiatrists hastily attempted to discover new psychological diseases. Classifying a 
new disease was lucrative, as Read et al. (2004) describes how Kraepelin received over 
$500,000 from the Rockefeller Foundation (p.21). Mostly relying on observations of 
behavioral symptoms, Kraepelin eventually claimed to discover dementia praecox 
around 1896. Despite the absence of any biological evidence, Kraepelin assumed 
dementia praecox was an independent disease entity with degenerative outcomes for the 
individual. Read et al. mentions that Kraeplin believed “people who got better didn’t 
have dementia praecox” (p.22). This assumption was challenged by Eugen Bleuler who 
noticed that many individuals were successfully able to recover from the hypothesized 
disease. This disagreement led Bleuler to coin the term schizophrenia in 1908. Although 
it was important for Bleuler to recognize that the disease was not always degenerative, 
Bentall (1990) argues that he, like Kraepelin, “overlooked the necessity of 
demonstrating that his construct was derived from an observed pattern” (p.13). The 
methods used to determine an illness, by both Kraepelin and Bleuler, have been highly 
criticized for being both scientifically unreliable and invalid. For example, Bentall notes 
that the descriptions of dementia praecox and schizophrenia are virtually identical to 
“the infectious disorder called encephalitis lethargic and its Parkinsoniansequelae” 
(p.15). It is not argued that Kraepelin or Bleuler made-up their discoveries, but that they 
prematurely labeled a disease that they had little evidence to support. Further, they also 
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ignored the role of social context, as Read et al. argues that “some people get upset 
when locked up” (29). Instead of acknowledging these experiences as normal reactions 
to captivity, psychiatrists often pathologized these symptoms as proof of an 
abnormality. Despite retrospective critiques of the birth of schizophrenia and the 
diagnostic paradigm, these views faced little resistance at the time and carried over into 
what would become one of the most atrocious periods in the history of mental illness. 
 This atrocious period was primarily influenced by the eugenics movement 
initiated by Francis Galton. Although Darwin’s theory of evolution did not specifically 
call for a eugenics movement, eugenics latched onto Darwin’s idea that species 
evolution was determined by the quality of genes. Whitaker explains that Galton coined 
the term eugenics in 1883 “to encourage [the] fit to procreate and prevent [the] unfit 
from doing the same” (p.44). This notion that humans could breed a superior race if 
they restricted the breeding of unfit humans, led to severe consequences for asylum 
patients of the time. Although the eugenics movement started in Europe, America 
would eventually become heavily involved. Whitaker argues that it was in America 
where “a society would first develop laws for compulsory sterilization of the mentally 
ill” (p.45). This was marketed as a benefit to society and to the mentally ill, as 
sterilization was said to eliminate tainted genes from the gene pool. By inferring 
insanity and undesirable behavior to be heritable, psychiatrists were able to justify the 
sterilization and murder of thousands of patients. Besides sterilization, other inhumane 
methods of treatment during 1900-1950 focused on reducing the brain function of the 
insane. This was thought to help the insane become more simple minded. Common 
treatments included electroshock therapy, inducing comas, and prefrontal lobotomies. 
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The mentally ill were not voluntarily signing up for these treatments, but were being 
forced to endure them. While contemporary society has moved away from eugenic 
principles, it is still commonly accepted that the mentally ill have defective genes. 
Psychiatric Revolution of 1950’s 
Two of the most prominent contributions to the modern psychiatric paradigm 
would evolve during the 1950’s. The ideas of Kraepelin and Bleuler would provide the 
framework, in which these developments arose. The first of these developments was the 
original Diagnostic and Statistics Manual of Mental Disorders(DSM) published in 
1952, while the second was the introduction of anti-psychotic drugs in 1954. Both of 
these developments contributed to the eventual deinstitutionalization of the mentally ill, 
and both play a significant function in the current treatment of schizophrenic suffering.  
When the first DSM was introduced in 1952, it came at a time when asylums 
were over capacity, and many returning WWII veterans experienced suffering from war 
trauma. The American Psychiatric Association decided to create a classification system, 
which supposedly served to efficiently study and treat mental illness. Reflecting the 
assumptions of Kraepelin, the DSM affirms that mental disorders are real disorders, 
which are located in the brain, and are described by behavioral symptoms. However, the 
DSM classification of homosexuality as a disorder exemplifies how diseases of the time 
better reflect social attitudes, rather than natural disorders. In any case, the DSM 
primarily served a pragmatic function by allowing experts to efficiently group together 
patients with similar symptoms. It has since become the fundamental guide for all of 
clinical psychology. 
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The next most significant development to modern schizophrenic treatment came 
in 1954 with the introduction of chlorpromazine. Whitaker argues that at first America 
perceived lobotomy as “the fruit of both good science and a humanitarian empathy for 
the mentally ill” (p.138). However after the atrocities of WWII, Americans started to 
question the moral valence of treatments such as lobotomy, electroshock, and 
sterilization. American psychiatrists needed to find a new treatment process that did not 
reflect the brutality of Nazi’s. Chlorpromazine was the first anti-psychotic medication to 
be developed. Although it was first synthesized in Europe, Whitaker explores how 
global leadership in drug development shifted to the United States because the financial 
opportunities were much greater (p.148). There was a growing relationship between 
pharmaceutical companies and physicians. By using mass marketing, chlorpromazine 
eventually became the successor to schizophrenic treatments and was hailed as a 
wonder drug.   
The growth of the pharmaceutical industry coincided with a social movement 
away from asylums. American asylums had been economically unstable for quite some 
time. Whitaker describes how in 1963 President Kennedy unveiled his plan for 
reforming the nation’s care for the mentally ill. Kennedy stated that “the new drugs 
made it possible for most of the mentally ill to be successfully and quickly treated in 
their own communities and returned to a useful place in society” (p.156). Although 
community support for the mentally ill was a positive step forward, this movement 
prematurely trusted the value of anti-psychotic drugs. Unfortunately, the foundation for 
deinstitutionalization was based on the assumption that anti-psychotic drugs benefited 
the suffering. Whitaker argues that deinstitutionalization “was a good-news tale that 
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was missing one key voice: that of the mentally ill” (p.158). When physicians sold the 
idea to the general public that anti-psychotic drugs were beneficial, they did so knowing 
that the drugs had profound side-effects. One side-effect of chlorpromazine was the 
induction of Tardive Dyskinesia. This side-effect produced involuntary facial and body 
twitches. Other side-effects contributed to death of brain tissue, and to a lack of 
motivation. Despite these alarming consequences, physicians succeeded in convincing 
the nation that anti-psychotic drugs were the most effective and humane approach for 
treating schizophrenia. 
Aftershock of the 1950’s and Modern Making-up of Schizophrenia 
The modern making-up of schizophrenia is heavily influenced by the psychiatric 
paradigm, the DSM, and anti-psychotic drugs. Bentall (1990) estimates that 
“approximately 1% of individuals in western countries can be expected to be labeled 
‘schizophrenic’ at sometime in their lives” (p.23). Schizophrenia is related to states of 
psychosis, which are mental states that involve a loss of contact with reality. The DSM-
IV defines psychotic as “the presence of certain symptoms” (p.297). Although 
symptoms vary across cultures, it is assumed that schizophrenia is a universal disease 
that is mediated through culture. Subtypes of schizophrenia were included in the DSM-
IV: paranoid type, disorganized type, catatonic type, undifferentiated type, and residual 
type. These subtypes have since been thrown away due to a lack of reliability. However, 
the variability amongst people diagnosed with schizophrenia is immense. Due to media 
coverage, schizophrenia is often associated with psychopaths and murderers. This does 
not reflect reality because many people experience states of psychosis and do not act 
evilly.  
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The American Psychiatric Association recently published the fifth edition of the 
DSM (2013). For someone to attain insurance and treatment for mental illness in 
America, the person must be diagnosed with an illness from the DSM. Schizophrenia is 
one of hundreds of hypothesized disorders. The DSM primarily describes behavioral 
symptoms, but spends little time explaining causes or methods of treatment. Further, it 
is assumed that symptoms are harmful products of the disorder, which should therefore 
be eradicated. According to the DSM, there are five key symptoms of schizophrenia: 1) 
delusions, 2) hallucinations, 3) disorganized speech, 4) disorganized or catatonic 
behavior, and 5) negative symptoms. Delusions are described as erroneous beliefs, such 
as thinking the CIA is following you. Hallucinations can occur through any sensory 
modality, but the most common form of hallucinations are auditory. Negative 
symptoms are described as a lack of emotion, sociability, or motivation. The DSM 
claims that a person must have two of these five symptoms, but at least one of those 
symptoms must be from the first three criteria. Further, it requires that disturbances 
have persisted for at least six months. Despite these seemingly arbitrary cutoffs, the 
DSM does not lack in detail.  
Since the publication of the original DSM, the number of disorders has 
increased from 106 to near 300. Has the increase in number of mental disorders truly 
been a product of scientific discovery? Does the classification system truly benefit the 
treatment of suffering? Or has the psychiatric community convinced us that the DSM 
serves more than a pragmatic purpose, when pragmatism seems to be its only purpose? 
These are important questions that will be addressed at a later time. For now, if the 
DSM has a place in the future progression of treatments, it should limit the current 
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emphasis on behavioral symptoms. It should include more investigation into biological 
and social factors influencing suffering, and provide effective methods of treatment. 
Most importantly, the DSM should negate common stereotypes of mental illness, and 
aim to empower those suffering. 
Since the 1950’s, pharmaceutical drugs have become a billion dollar industry. In 
a brilliant exploration into the globalization of the American psyche, Watters (2010) 
mentions that Western drug companies “spend billions marketing medications for 
mental illness” (p.3-4). Marketing is not only restricted to the United States, but has 
spread globally. Despite the obvious side-effects of anti-psychotic drugs like 
chlorpromazine, they have remained the staple of psychiatric treatment for 
schizophrenia. Psychiatric hospitals were extremely packed in the 1950’s with over 
500,000 patients. However, by the 1990’s Mckenzie et al. (2008) states that the 
population of psychiatric patients had fallen to about 100,000 (p.4364-7). This decrease 
in psychiatric patients is not due to a decrease in mental illness, but rather the 
movement of deinstitutionalization. Lamb (1984) explains how the decrease in 
psychiatric patients created significant consequences, such as an increase in the 
homeless population. People who were mentally suffering were now more susceptible 
to becoming homeless or incarcerated. After the 1950’s, treatment of schizophrenia had 
thankfully moved away from sterilization and lobotomy. However, the progress of 
treatments since the inception of anti-psychotic drugs can not be considered a success 
story. Those experiencing schizophrenic suffering today are in more need than ever for 
the psychiatric community to revolutionize, and progress treatments further. 
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Chapter 2: Crisis Within the Psychiatric Paradigm 
Fortunately, the psychiatric paradigm has continuously been challenged by 
dissenters throughout history. Although dissenters have long been the minority, recently 
there has been a significant growth in the movement away from the psychiatric 
paradigm. This movement greatly developed during the 1960’s anti-psychiatry 
movement, and has since expanded to work within the system it defies. The most 
important claims of this movement can be summarized as follows: 
1) The discovery, or invention, of schizophrenia was based on invalid and 
unreliable methods of Kraeplin and Bleuler. Despite this, the psychiatric 
paradigm continuously affirms that schizophrenia is a real disorder. If 
Kraepelin nor Bleuler never discovered schizophrenia, then who did?  
2) Affirming schizophrenia as a real disorder contributes to the misdiagnosis 
and over-diagnosis of those suffering. Assuming a hypothesized disorder is 
the source of suffering   causes psychiatrists to overlook others factors 
potentially contributing to suffering. This includes substance abuse, trauma, 
and socioeconomic factors.  
3) More attention must be given to the personal experiences and cultural 
influences of those suffering. Schizophrenia is not a disease mediated 
through culture, but rather a form of suffering tied together with culture and 
personal experiences. 
4) Biological factors are not denied. However, to label someone with a disease 
should require more evidence than behavioral symptoms. Describing a 
disease in terms of behavioral symptoms does little to progress biological 
components. Without becoming reductionist towards physiology, more 
research is needed to progress physiological treatments that do not have 
profound side-effects.  
5) Further, when one is misdiagnosed with schizophrenia, this can perpetuate 
suffering due to the stigma that comes along with the label of mental illness. 
6) Most importantly, the future progression of treatments depends on the 
movement away from drugs and the schizophrenic label. Treatments should 
not perpetuate suffering, but serve to support and empower those suffering 
Thomas Kuhn (1962) investigated the structures of scientific revolutions. Kuhn asserted 
that the progression of science was heavily influenced by sociological and cultural 
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factors. According to Kuhn, science is conducted within a given paradigm; the 
assumptions, discourse, materials, methods, and so on that guide the researcher’s 
practice. He proposed two essential characteristics of paradigms; “their achievement 
was sufficiently unprecedented to attract an enduring group of adherents away from 
competing modes of scientific activity. Simultaneously, it was sufficiently open-ended 
to leave all sorts of problems for the redefined group of practitioners to resolve” (p.10). 
In the case of the psychiatric paradigm, Kuhn’s characteristics hold true. The 
psychiatric paradigm attracted a group of followers, and left many questions open-
ended. For example, researchers have spent decades searching for genetic and 
biological components of schizophrenia. By assuming schizophrenia is a disease with 
biological markers, the psychiatric paradigm created an open-ended problem that 
researchers have pursued for years. Although paradigms serve as the foundation guiding 
future research, paradigms do not always gain acceptance from everyone. 
During the 1960’s, major developments in the anti-psychiatry movement vocally 
opposed the psychiatric paradigm. Kuhn’s model of scientific revolutions suggests that 
a paradigm will flourish, until it is replaced by a more progressive paradigm. What 
causes a paradigm shift to occur? According to Kuhn, scientists work diligently to 
discover phenomenon that support their paradigm. However, discoveries that oppose the 
existing paradigm are often overlooked; “by ensuring that the paradigm will not be too 
easily surrendered, resistance guarantees that scientists will not be lightly distracted and 
that the anomalies that lead to paradigm change will penetrate existing knowledge to the 
core” (p.65). For example, this excerpt from Whitaker gives one example of how the 
psychiatric paradigm dealt with anomalies; 
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“Evidence that neuroleptics were making people chronically ill showed 
up fairly early. In 1967, NIMH investigators reported on one-year 
outcomes for the 270 patients in its earlier six-week study that had 
declared neuroleptics to be anti-schizophrenic drugs. Much to their 
surprise, the patients that had not been treated in the hospitals with drugs 
“were less likely to be rehospitalized than those who received any kind 
of the three active phenothiazines.” The researchers, scrambling to come 
up with an explanation for this finding, speculated that perhaps hospital 
staff during the initial trial had felt sorry for the placebo patients 
(because they weren’t getting well as fast as the drug treated patients) 
and thus had given them “some special quality in care, treatment, or 
concern” that led to the better one-year outcomes. It was an explanation 
that revealed more about the researchers than the patients: The NIHM 
investigators simply couldn’t conceive of the possibility that neuroleptics 
were harming people” (p.181) 
This example reveals how there is often resistance from scientific communities when 
anomalies provoke their paradigm. Resistance occurs along with reinterpretation, as in 
this example the investigators tried to explain the results in a way that still supported 
their paradigm. 
According to Kuhn, anomalies alone are not enough to catalyze a full paradigm 
change. However, when the awareness of anomalies has “lasted so long and penetrated 
so deep [then] one can appropriately describe the fields affected by it as in a state of 
growing crisis” (p.67). States of crisis demand “large-scale paradigm destruction”, and 
“the solution to each of them had been at least partially anticipated during a period 
when there was no crisis in the corresponding science; and in the absence of crisis those 
anticipations had been ignored.” (p.67,75). Periods of crisis are therefore necessary 
components of scientific progress. They serve to challenge deteriorating paradigms, and 
provide new means for approaching a given problem. If the crisis is resolved, the result 
is a scientific revolution that abandons the previous paradigm in favor of a new 
progressive paradigm. In the case of the psychiatric paradigm, enough anomalies arose 
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by the 1960’s to influence the creation of the anti-psychiatry movement. This marked 
the inception of a full blown crisis period. Despite the inception of crisis occurring 50 
years ago, the psychiatric paradigm remains in a crisis period today. The psychiatric 
paradigm has successfully resisted a complete revolution for multiple reasons. 
However, dissenters continue to attack the psychiatric paradigm, and even work from 
within it to defy it from the inside. Ultimately, this section will investigate the main 
claims of anti-psychiatry to reveal why the psychiatric paradigm is in a state of crisis, 
and why the resolution of this crisis is essential to the progress of treatments. 
Reliability and Validity 
I will be investigating four critiques of schizophrenia and the psychiatric 
paradigm. The first critique relates to claims (1) and (2) noted above. If Kraepelin and 
Bleuler never reliably diagnosed schizophrenia, then the validity of schizophrenia 
should be put into question. Consider this excerpt from Bentall (1990); 
“For all these years researchers have been chasing a ghost within the 
body-politic of psychiatry…the concept of schizophrenia was full of 
contradictions at birth; perhaps it remains full of contradictions now. Put 
simply, it is possible that schizophrenia is not a meaningful scientific 
concept and that it should therefore be abandoned along with all the 
other meaningless concepts…which have been cast aside by scientists 
during crucial periods of scientific progress…The current state of 
schizophrenia research (many variables implicated, none conclusively) is 
precisely what would be expected to result from the traditional 
schizophrenia researcher’s strategy of comparing heterogeneous groups 
of ‘normals’ with equally heterogeneous samples of ‘schizophrenics” 
(p.24) 
Reliability of a diagnostic system refers to its ability to consistently account for a given 
phenomenon. If schizophrenia is a reliable disorder, then a patient diagnosed with 
schizophrenia by one psychiatrist, should also be diagnosed with schizophrenia by all 
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other psychiatrists. In psychology, reliability is a precondition for validity. Validity has 
multiple components, but most importantly it refers to the realness, meaningfulness, and 
usefulness of phenomenon. Again consider Bentall; 
“The symptoms of a hypothesized disorder should correlate with each 
other - a patient having one symptom of schizophrenia would have a 
high probability of experiencing other symptoms of the alleged disorder. 
Moreover, on the basis of diagnosis the clinician should be able to 
predict the course and outcome of the disorder, and whether or not it is 
likely to respond to particular treatments. Also, there should ideally be 
some relationship between diagnosis and etiology ” (p.25). 
Due to the diagnostic system operationalizing schizophrenia with behavioral symptoms, 
these sets of criteria serve as the foundation for schizophrenic reliability. If these 
symptoms are assumed to be the most predictive sign of schizophrenia, then clinicians 
should be able to reliably diagnose patients based on this criteria. The modern 
diagnostic criteria for schizophrenia has remained rather consistent since the 1950’s. 
However, a large reliability study by Hunt et al. (1953) found that consistency for 
schizophrenia was only 37%. Two decades later, Copeland et al. (1971) gave 134 US 
and 194 British clinicians a description of a patient. While 69% of US psychiatrists 
diagnosed schizophrenia, only 2% of the British clinicians did so. Some of the most 
elaborate experiments were conducted by Rosenhan (1973), who admitted ‘normal’ 
people into psychiatric hospitals. These pseudo-patients complained of hearing voices, 
but this was the only faked symptom as they otherwise acted calm and ‘normal’. All 
patients were admitted to psychiatric hospitals, and all but one were diagnosed with 
schizophrenia. Once the pseudo-patients were inside, they stopped exhibiting symptoms 
and started taking notes on the behavior of the hospital staff. Many pseudo-patients 
commented on the dehumanizing actions of nurses towards patients. It was estimated 
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that nurses only spent an average of 6.8 minutes a day with each patient. Rosenhan 
(1975) then ran the experiment in reverse, telling a psychiatric hospital that at some 
point in the next 3 months he would have one or more pseudo-patients admitted. No 
pseudo-patients were actually sent, yet of the 193 new patients the staff identified 41 as 
potential pseudo-patients. Rosenhan comments, “the facts of the matter are that we have 
known for a long time that diagnoses are often not useful or reliable, but we have 
nevertheless continued to use them” (p.257). Although the American Psychiatric 
Association has attempted to make criteria more reliable, the criteria used today is 
practically the same criteria used since the 1950's.  
 If the reliability of schizophrenia is unsound, this would predict the validity 
would also be baseless. There is a tendency for clinicians to speak of schizophrenia as 
an independent neurological disorder. However, this tendency is based in minimal 
evidence, as few clinicians would claim to know with certainty the causes of the 
disorder. If schizophrenia is a valid disorder, then symptoms should correlate with each 
other. The World Health organization performed a study (1973) in which a cluster 
analysis was performed on patients suffering from various disorders. Clustering served 
to group together patients who experienced the most similar symptoms. They found that 
“clusters are defining different and more homogeneous groups than are the clinical 
diagnoses”, and “patients diagnosed as schizophrenic are distributed in all clusters” 
(p.350). This illustrates the problem of comorbidity with psychiatric disorders. Many 
people diagnosed with schizophrenia often fit the criteria for other disorders. In fact, 
Ellason and Ross (1995) found that people diagnosed with dissociative identity disorder 
have more schizophrenic symptoms than those diagnosed with schizophrenia. Read et 
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al. (2002) notes that schizophrenia correlates with “depression, obsessive-compulsive 
disorder, panic disorder, personality disorder, substance abuse, post-traumatic stress 
disorder, and anxiety disorders” (p.48). Ideally, if schizophrenia was an independent 
disorder, then we would not expect many people to be suffering from a multitude of 
disorders. Further, the validity of schizophrenia rests on its ability to predict its course, 
as well as to predict effective responses to treatment. However, both the course of 
schizophrenia and its response to treatment have been demonstrated to be highly 
variable. Despite Kraepelin’s assumption that schizophrenia is a degenerative disease, a 
long tern study by Harding et al. (1987) found that 82% of patients had not been back to 
a hospital, 40% were employed, and 68% had few or no symptoms. Further, Kendell 
and Brockington (1980) found that symptoms were poor predictors of outcome after 6 
years.  
 Ultimately, the lack of reliability and validity in regards to schizophrenia has led 
researchers to challenge the utility of the concept. If schizophrenia does not serve to 
describe a homogeneous group of people experiencing the same brain abnormality, then 
is schizophrenia a useful scientific concept? The answer to this question will be 
developed continuously throughout the rest of the paper. For now, it is important to 
recognize using an unreliable and invalid scientific concept leads to consequences for 
those suffering. Perhaps most directly, it leads to the over-diagnosis and misdiagnosis of 
those suffering. As Whitaker explains; 
“Numerous studies detailed just how eager American psychiatrists were 
to make a diagnosis. A researcher who reviewed Manhattan State 
Hospital’s 1982 case records determined that 80 percent of the 
‘schizophrenic’ patients there had never exhibited symptoms necessary 
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to support such a diagnosis. Nationwide, it was estimated that more than 
100,000 people had been misdiagnosed” (p.169). 
Being diagnosed with a mental illness can have a profound effect on one’s psyche. If 
the schizophrenic concept is invalid and unreliable, then many people diagnosed with 
schizophrenia have likely been labeled so unjustly. The effects of misdiagnosis will be 
later explored in the section on labeling theory. For now, misdiagnosis reflects the 
reliance on behavioral symptoms to diagnose mental illness, as opposed to inspecting 
the physical brain or the complex psychosocial factors of the individual. Focusing on 
symptoms blinds the clinician from other sources of suffering. 
Cultural and Social Differences 
It is often assumed that schizophrenia is a universal human disorder mediated 
through culture. For example, schizophrenics outside the US would not likely 
experience delusions of the CIA following them, because the CIA is not relevant in 
their culture. Cultural variation is thought to be noise, indicative of a deeper biological 
disease. However, some cultural psychologists have suggested that instead of culture 
being a medium to express deeper brain functions, rather culture is deeply tied together 
and inseparable from brain functions. This is not so surprising considering that brains 
primary functions involve processing the environment. When referring to culture, I use 
a broad definition essentially including anything occurring in one’s environment. 
Cultures are not stagnant concepts, but rather change over time. Further, people within 
the same culture can interpret that cultural differently. The role of cultural importance is 
often overlooked by clinicians when diagnosing schizophrenia. Understanding an 
individual’s personal and cultural context can help reveal sources of suffering.  
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Cultural influences are most prominent in regards to mental illnesses defined as 
culturally-bound illnesses. These illnesses are described as forms of suffering that are 
accepted in certain cultures but not others. Further, these illnesses are thought to be a 
manifestation of cultural expectations, rather than a biological foundation. Culturally-
bound illnesses are often distinguished from universal mental disorders, although the 
distinction is not well defined. For example, dhat syndrome is a disorder in India that 
involves men suffering from the loss of semen. This reflects the belief in India’s culture 
that semen is a precious resource. Although there is no biological foundation for the 
disorder, it can cause immense suffering for the individual. However, Americans do not 
classify dhat syndrome as a disorder because semen is dispensable in American culture. 
This illustrates the prominent role of cultures in defining what classifies a mental 
illness. Western society is no exception, as some examples of culturally-bound illnesses 
include hysteria, attention-deficit disorder, and eating disorders. For example, eating 
disorders don’t develop in societies that value heavier women as a sign of vitality. 
Eating disorders developed in the West partly because it provided an environment in 
which slenderness was seen as the ultimate aesthetic value. The behaviors of eating 
disorders are thought to be derived from cultural expectations rather than biological 
properties. It is important to recognize that people do not choose to develop an eating 
disorder, but the expectations of one’s culture can influence one’s subconscious into 
expressing accepted forms of suffering. While schizophrenia is generally not seen as a 
culturally-bound illness, it is important to investigate cultural values and expectations 
that may influence the expression and diagnosis of schizophrenic suffering.  
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Expectations of a culture can profoundly influence schizophrenic suffering. For 
example, Watters (2010) explains how “those living in urban settings in the United 
States and Europe appear to suffer more often from the disease than those living in the 
country or suburbs. These curious spikes in the disorder remain even when researchers 
took migration, drug use, and poverty out of the equation” (p.136). There is something 
about living in the city that influences a higher prevalence of schizophrenia. Although 
no absolute consensus exists as to why rates are higher in cities, there is certainly a 
connection between schizophrenia and city life. Further, the expectations of culture can 
also influence discrimination against others. Many studies have confirmed that a 
disproportional amount of African Americans and poor people are diagnosed with 
schizophrenia. Whitaker explains that “a 1982 study of 1,023 African Americans said to 
be schizophrenic determined that 64 percent didn’t exhibit symptoms necessary” 
(p.173). On top of that, African-Americans were more likely to be committed to a 
psychiatric unit against their will. It is also mentioned that people with lower 
socioeconomic status had eight times the risk of being diagnosed with schizophrenia; 
“behaviors and emotions that can lead to a diagnosis of schizophrenia - hostility, anger, 
emotional withdrawal, paranoia- go hand in hand with being poor” (p.173). The racial 
and classist disparity that haunted asylums of the 19th century, remains today. 
One of the most important blows to the psychiatric paradigm regarding 
schizophrenia came when the World Health Organization published their controversial 
pilot study on schizophrenia (1967). This study investigated schizophrenics from 
different countries and measured many variables influencing the course and outcome of 
schizophrenia. The most surprising finding from this study was that although rates of 
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schizophrenia appeared to be similar in most countries, the durations and outcomes of 
schizophrenia were significantly worse in developed industrialized countries. The study 
has been replicated multiple times and yielded parallel results each time. Such results 
sparked the question, why would outcomes of schizophrenia be worse in developed 
countries that presumably have better experts and better medication?  
There have been a number of hypotheses to explain the WHO results. Heine’s 
(2012) cultural psychology textbook  lists three of the leading theories: 
1) “People in less developed countries tend to have a more fatalistic 
attitude and less of a primary sense of control, which may lead them to 
be less blameworthy toward people with schizophrenia (Barrowclough & 
Hooley, 2003)” (p.483).  
2) “Beliefs in possession by spirits are far more common in many 
less developed societies, so a person who claims to feel as though they’re 
hearing voices or are possessed may be viewed as less problematic 
(Evans, 1992)” (p.483-4) 
3) “The stronger sense of community felt in many less developed 
societies means that those suffering with schizophrenia are less likely to 
be left on their own, and thus are less likely to end up being homeless” 
(p.484) 
Further, Watters (2010) dedicates an entire chapter of his book investigating the 
problematic results of the WHO study. He describes his time spent with anthropologist 
Juli McGruder, who was researching schizophrenia in Zanzibar. McGruder was 
interested in the emotional tenor of families living with ‘schizophrenic’ relatives. 
Watters mentions McGruder was also interested in how local ideas about mental illness 
“were beginning to intermingle and sometimes compete with the imported Western idea 
that mental illnesses were caused by biological brain malfunction” (p.132). McGruder 
was confident that “there were enough variations to suggest that the disease was shaped 
by something besides the purely genetic or biological” (p.134). By closely working with 
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families affected by ‘schizophrenia’, McGruder set out to discover “what ideas and 
beliefs do family members in developing nations use to understand the delusional 
behaviors of a loved one? How do they talk about this behavior - what specific words 
and ideas do they employ? And, critically, how does the local understanding of the 
illness impact the beliefs, behaviors, and self -conception of the ill family member?” 
(p.140). 
 Some of the answers to the questions McGruder investigated can be illustrated 
by the story of Hemed and his daughter Kimwana. McGruder worked closely with 
Hemed’s family in Zanzibar. It is mentioned that “the period in which Hemed began to 
experience symptoms of schizophrenia was, not coincidentally, a time of political 
upheaval on the island” (p.142). Watters explains that “such an onset of schizophrenia 
can be explained by the stress-diathesis model, the theory that biological factors make 
one vulnerable to schizophrenia, but stress in one’s environment may set off the illness” 
(p.143). Kimwana’s stress manifested when she entered the workforce at a time when 
drastic change was occurring for women on the island. Watters describes that “much of 
the torment of having these male presences in her head related to Islamic rules of 
female modesty” (p.146). Despite having two members of the family suffering from 
psychotic symptoms, the family “displayed an amazing tolerance for [these] 
difficulties” (p.148). This except about the family reveals cross-cultural differences that 
influence the course and outcome of ‘schizophrenia’; 
“McGruder rarely witnessed Amina or anyone else in the family pressure 
Kimwana into displaying normal behaviors. During periods when 
Kimwana was feeling well, for instance, Amina would report that she 
had washed dishes or swept the house. But Amina didn't assume a cause 
and an effect between productivity and wellness. This goes against some 
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of the basic tenets of Western occupational therapy, which suggests that 
the path to mental health can be found in productivity and participation 
in group activity. Although the family viewed her participation in 
household chores as a sign of health, they didn't pressure her to perform 
chores with the assumption that they were curative. Indeed, when 
Kimwana was doing poorly, the family allowed and even encouraged her 
to withdraw from a activity and to rest. Often, when she tried to help out 
during such times, her family cautioned her not to overextended herself. 
For the most part, however, Kimwana was allowed to drift back and 
forth from illness to relative health without much monitoring or 
comment by the rest of the family. Periods of troubled behavior were not 
greeted with expressions of concern or alarm, and neither were times of 
wellness celebrated. As such, Kimwana felt little pressure to self-identify 
as someone with a permanent mental illness. This stood in contrast with 
the diagnosis of schizophrenia as McGruder knew it was used in the 
West. There the diagnosis carries the assumption of a chronic condition, 
one that often comes to define a person. The prizing of rest over work 
and passive acceptance of abnormal behavior versus active 
encouragement or criticism were representative of an overall calm 
emotional tone in the household. Even on difficult days there was an air 
of tolerance when dealing with Hemed’s and Kimwana’s disturbed 
behavior. McGruder believed that this tone emanated not simply from 
personalities in this particular family but from cultural cues in Zanzibar” 
(p.150-1) 
The story of Hemed’s family reflects a broader schism related to views of psychiatric 
suffering. Hemed’s family did not view suffering as a sensation necessitating 
eradication, but rather suffering was accepted as a meaningful condition of life. Their 
family “believed that God’s grace awaited those who not only endured suffering but 
were grateful for the opportunity to prove their ability to endure it” (p.155). Further, the 
belief in spirit possession “had the counterintuitive effect of lessening the stigma 
attached to the behavior of the mentally ill person. It made bizarre and or disruptive 
behavior more understandable and forgivable” (p.157). Emotional influences have also 
been investigated in Western society. Multiple studies have shown how living with  
family with high expressed-emotion (EE) increases relapse rates for those suffering. EE 
is described as criticism, hostility, or emotional over-involvement towards a suffering 
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family member. Watters explains that “in a paper that aggregated the data from dozens 
of studies, researchers noted that the relapse rates were three to seven times greater for 
patients from high-expressed-emotion families” (p.153). This intense involvement from 
family members “springs from a hopeful engagement of the problem,” but “might be 
the very thing that exacerbates the illness” (164). Thus, emotional tenor can have 
profound effects on the course and outcome of those suffering. Cultures such as 
Zanzibar accept suffering as a natural condition of life, which contributes to a relaxed 
and supportive emotional tenor. However, Americans typically invest intense emotions 
to try and understand and eradicate suffering, which may contribute to additional stress 
that perpetuates suffering.  
 Cultural variation is one of the most important factors to recognize when 
treating schizophrenic suffering. If schizophrenia were a universal disease with a 
primarily biological foundation, we would expect the course and outcome to be similar 
across cultures. However, this is far from the truth as outcomes of schizophrenia vary 
widely across cultures. Perhaps, the universality of psychotic experiences instead 
reflects a cultural foundation, the universality of a stressful environment, which 
interacts with biological properties of the brain. Perhaps the distinction between 
culturally-bound illnesses and universal disorders is not ontologically discrete. In David 
Morris’s brilliant exploration titled The Culture of Pain (1991), he challenges two of the 
most influential assumptions of the modern psychiatric paradigm. First, the assumption 
that mental and physical pain are ontologically discrete, and second that pain is best 
understood by medical experts. This excerpt from Morris reveals the problems with the 
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modern conception of pain, and asserts that pain is always intricately tied together with 
culture; 
“Certainly we can take comfort in assuming that pain obeys the general 
laws of human anatomy and physiology that govern our bodies. The fact 
is, however, that the culture we live in and our deepest personal beliefs 
subtly or massively recast our experiences of pain. Normally the shaping 
force of culture and belief passes almost unobserved. Like upright 
posture, our everyday experience of the world seems so natural - so 
‘given’ - that we take it for granted. It is less our pain than our culture, 
however, that draws us irresistibly toward the medicine cabinet, as if 
pills and tablets held some kind of magnetic, eternal attraction for the 
unseen torments of a bad back. The story of how our minds and cultures 
continuously reconstruct the experience of pain demands that we look 
beyond the medicine cabinet. Medicine, in fact, because of its dominant 
position in our culture, tends automatically to suppress or to overpower 
all the other voices that offer us a different understanding of pain, 
including voices of dissent within medicine” (p.2) 
Trauma and Psychosis 
The most imperative criticism to address is the relationship between psychosis 
and trauma. Trauma can refer to many experiences and it is difficult to define. This is 
because traumatic experiences are mediated through the subjective mind. What may be 
traumatic for one individual, may not bother another individual. The stress-diathesis 
model mentioned previously also relates to trauma. When one encounters a traumatic 
and typically stressful experience, the brain (conscious and subconscious) must then 
figure out effective coping strategies. The prevalence and importance of traumatic 
experiences has often been overlooked by clinicians. When clinicians are immersed in 
diagnosing behavioral symptoms, they ignore hearing about the life story of the 
individual which can often reveal sources of suffering. Unfortunately, one of the most 
common sources of trauma is childhood sexual and emotional abuse. For too long the 
psychiatric paradigm has neglected the fact that sometimes trauma can directly 
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influence states of psychosis. Thus, does diagnosing someone with schizophrenia 
because they fit certain behavioral symptoms, truly serve a beneficial purpose if that 
person is obviously suffering from past trauma? 
First we must establish the relationship between trauma and psychosis. Judith 
Herman (1992) explores the expansive impacts of traumatic experiences. The 
relationship between trauma and suffering has not always been denied. For example, 
Freud (1896) claimed that “at the bottom of every case of hysteria there are one or more 
occurrences of premature sexual experience” (p.203). However, Herman describes how 
Freud quickly repudiated that claim because of its social and political implications 
(p.14). If Freud’s theory was correct, then sexual abuse was an endemic in both the 
proletariat and bourgeois classes. After Freud denied his own theory, he was forced to 
reinterpret the causes of hysteria. He now believed that women fabricated their 
traumatic experiences, and “insisted upon exploring feelings of erotic excitement, as if 
the exploitative situation were a fulfillment of desire” (p.14). Unfortunately, this was 
not the only time in history that women’s trauma was repressed, as Herman describes 
that for the first half of the 20th century “to speak about experiences in sexual or 
domestic life was to invite public humiliation, ridicule, and disbelief. Women were 
silenced by fear and shame, and the silence of women gave license to every form of 
sexual and domestic exploitation” (p.28). Luckily, the women’s liberation movement of 
the 1970’s paved the way for women to safely speak out against sexual and domestic 
violence. A study conducted by Russell (1984) interviewed over 900 women and found 
that one in four women had been raped, while one in three had been sexually abused as 
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a child. The women’s liberation movement would finally provide a platform, in which 
women could feel safe and seek out treatment for years of repressed memories.  
Herman mentions that “the ordinary response to atrocities is to banish them from 
consciousness” (p.1). However, she adds that atrocities “refuse to be buried” (p.1). This 
highlights a conflict between wanting to deny horrible experiences, yet struggling to 
proclaim them aloud. These conflicting feelings can lead to a contrast of behaviors, on 
the one hand numbness and dissociation, on the other hand hyper-alertness and reliving 
the traumatic experience. The traumatic experience is not passively processed, but 
penetrates deeply into the victims psyche. Abram Kardiner (1947) excerpt describes the 
psychological and neurological effects of a traumatic experience; 
“The whole apparatus for concerted, coordinated, and purposeful activity 
is smashed. The perceptions become inaccurate and pervaded with terror, 
the coordinative functions of judgement and discrimination fail… the 
sense organs may even cease to function… The aggressive impulses 
become disorganized and unrelated to the situation in hand… The 
functions of the autonomic nervous system may also become 
disassociated with the rest of the organism” (p.186) 
The autonomic nervous system refers to systems that manage high and low arousal 
levels, the sympathetic and parasympathetic respectively. When a traumatic experience 
occurs, these systems act essentially as defense systems. Research has shown that 
environmental influences can potentiate alterations in the brain, which create 
preferences for one system over the other. For example, Schore (2003) found that 
common defenses of a more active sympathetic branch included acting out, mania, and 
externalizing behaviors, while common defenses to avoid highly arousing emotions 
(sympathetic branch) included denial, dissociation, and devaluation. Further, traumatic 
experiences, especially continuously reoccurring ones, have been shown to effect one’s 
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amygdala (emotional system) and hippocampus (memory system). The amygdala is a 
structure of the brain which, among other things, processes and triggers reactions to 
dangerous stimuli. Research by Bremner et al. (2005) shows that compared to a control 
group, those diagnosed with PTSD tend to have a more hyper-responsive amygdala. 
The hippocampus works closely with the amygdala in forming emotional memories. 
Carrion et. al. (2010) found that compared to a control group, those with trauma history 
were more likely to have a hypo-responsive hippocampus. The hyper-responsiveness of 
the amygdala and the hypo-responsiveness of the hippocampus illustrates the 
complicated response of the brain towards traumatic experiences. On the one hand the 
amygdala (emotional responses) becomes over-sensitized, while the hippocampus 
becomes desensitized towards the formation of memories. This is reflected by anecdotal 
evidence of people involved in severe auto accidents who can’t remember the details of 
the accident, but simultaneously feel highly emotional when they get in cars post-
accident. 
 Traumatic experiences are further complicated when the source of trauma is a 
fellow human being, rather than say a natural disaster. This excerpt from Herman 
highlights the significant relationship between victim, perpetrator, and witness; 
“It is very tempting to take the side of the perpetrator. All the perpetrator 
asks is that the bystander do nothing. [They] appeal to the universal 
desire to see, hear, and speak no evil. The victim, on the contrary, asks 
the bystander to share the burden of pain. The victim demands action, 
engagement, and remembering…To hold traumatic reality in 
consciousness requires a social context that affirms and protects the 
victim and that joins the victim and witnesses in a common alliance. For 
the individual victim, this social context is created by relationships with 
friends, lovers, and family. For the larger society, the social context is 
created by political movements that give voice to the disempowered” 
(p.7-9) 
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Things are further complicated due to the fact that perpetrators of sexual violence are 
most often people that are closely associated with the victim. Intimately knowing one’s 
perpetrator can cause profound psychological consequences for the victim. The victim 
is forced to evaluate how a previously trustworthy and loving individual could commit 
such an atrocious act. This phenomenon has been extensively studied by Pam Birrell 
and Jennifer Freyd (2013) who refer to it as betrayal blindness. Betrayal refers to when 
a trustworthy associate breaks the bond of trust by committing an atrocious act. 
Blindness refers to when victims are unconsciously encouraged to look away from 
abuse, in order to maintain stability in the relationship with the perpetrator. Children are 
especially susceptible to betrayal blindness because children are highly dependent on 
their caregivers. Although it may seem counterintuitive that an effective coping strategy 
would be to stay with the perpetrator, evidence shows that betrayal blindness is much 
more prevalent and revealing than anticipated. For example, Freyd et al. (2001) found 
that people who experienced sexual or physical abuse from a caretaker showed 
significant memory impairment compared to those abused by a non-caretaker. Further, 
Gobin&Freyd (2009) found that childhood trauma with high betrayal predicts 
revictimization in adolescence and adulthood. Finally, Gomez and Freyd (2013) 
discovered a relationship between betrayal and hallucinations. Three groups (High 
Betrayal, Medium Betrayal, No Betrayal) were measured for their rates of tactile, 
auditory, and visual hallucinations. The results showed that 72% of members in the high 
betrayal group experienced hallucinations, compared to 48% of medium betrayal 
members and only 24% of no betrayal members. It is important to recognize the 
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expansive impacts of traumatic experiences, as they can deeply penetrate and alter the 
life course of the individual. 
 The relationship between trauma and psychosis is undoubtedly revealing. A 
study by Lataster et al. (2006) surveyed over 1,000 young students and measured their 
exposure to sexual trauma and bullying. The study found that both sexual trauma and 
bullying were associated with psychotic symptoms. A longitudinal study conducted by 
Arseneault et al. (2011) discovered children who were exposed to intentional acts of 
abuse were more likely to experience psychotic symptoms than those only exposed to 
unintentional harm. Further, Lardinois et al. (2011) found a significant interaction 
between childhood trauma and daily life stress in psychotic patients. This finding 
suggested that a history of childhood abuse is associated with increased sensitivity to 
stress. Traumatic experiences do not only influence the development of psychotic 
symptoms, but they can also influence the content of symptoms. For example, 
Thompson et al. (2010) found “higher rates of attenuated psychotic symptoms of a 
sexual content in those with a history of sexual trauma” (p.88). This finding suggests 
that people experiencing auditory hallucinations often hear the critical voices of their 
abuser. Thus, the content of hallucinations and delusions which has for long been 
ignored by clinicians, may actually have symbolic meaning and deep connections to 
past traumatic experiences. This brings up the question, why might psychotic symptoms 
be a normal and effective reaction to trauma? The most compelling argument is that 
trauma induces hyper-vigilance, an enhanced state of sensitivity accompanied by 
behaviors which purpose is to detect threats. Herman (1992) explains that traumatized 
people “have an extreme startle response to unexpected stimuli” especially if the stimuli 
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is related to the traumatizing event (p.36). After trauma has occurred, and especially if it 
is reoccurring, the brain may develop a preference for hyper-vigilance, in order to 
notice threats before they occur. Perhaps symptoms of schizophrenia are not symptoms 
of a disease, but rather deeply rooted responses and expressions of the brain towards 
traumatic experiences.   
 Unfortunately, the DSM does not describe any relation between trauma and 
psychosis, which leads to an absence of dialogue about trauma when diagnosing people 
with psychotic symptoms. The psychiatric system ignores evidence that trauma can 
influence the onset and content of psychotic symptoms. Many victims are continuously 
tormented by their perpetrators long after the abuse has ended. For some people, it is 
unfathomable to imagine what it would be like to experience severe sexual trauma 
perpetrated by a close loved one. For others, this nightmare is reality. There is no 
“correct” way to respond to severe trauma. Responses and coping strategies are highly 
variable and occur both consciously and unconsciously. The development of psychotic 
symptoms may be one way the brain attempts to protect and heal itself after trauma, for 
better or for worse. It is important to affirm the relationship between trauma and 
psychosis, in order to make sure patients are not re-traumatized during treatment. 
Although not all people experiencing psychotic symptoms have trauma history, the 
prevalence and impact of traumatic experiences with psychosis commands more 
attention. Trauma can influence psychosis, and psychosis in itself can be traumatizing 
due to the stigma that is attached. The responses by others to one’s psychosis and 
diagnosis can also in itself be traumatizing, and this is the topic that will be developed 
in the succeeding section on labeling theory 
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Labeling Theory 
The final critique of the construct of schizophrenia I will analyze comes from 
labeling theory. Many scholars have investigated the consequences of labeling a group 
of people. Labeling theory’s foundational claim is that the terms used to classify an 
individual, influence the identity and behavior of those classified. Further, labeling can 
cause groups outside the label to infer that labeled groups are more homogeneous than 
they really are. Proponents of labeling theory have primarily investigated the 
consequences of labeling deviance from normality, such as crime and homosexuality. In 
regards to the psychiatric paradigm, labeling primarily serves a pragmatic purpose for 
clinicians to group together similar patients. Patients who are labeled can then seek out 
treatment that corresponds with their specific label. However, the stigma attached to 
certain labels can influence suffering. If the overall effects of labeling cause further 
suffering, then the system designed to support those suffering actually perpetuates 
suffering. The schizophrenic label undoubtedly helps clinicians converse and classify, 
but does the schizophrenic label truly benefit those suffering? 
First we must understand how labels influence the identity and behavior of those 
classified. Ian Hacking’s (1999) exploratory paper on making-up people argues that it 
“is not that there was a kind of person who came increasingly to be recognized by 
bureaucrats or by students of human nature but rather that a kind of person came into 
being at the same time as the kind itself was being invented. In some cases, that is, our 
classifications and our classes conspire to emerge hand in hand, each egging the other 
on” (p.165). Ironically, one of Hacking’s most prominent examples of this phenomenon 
is multiple personality disorder, a close relative to schizophrenia. Hacking claims that 
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“multiple personality as an idea and as a clinical phenomenon was invented around 
1875: only one or two possible cases per generation had been recorded before that time, 
but a whole flock of them came after” (p.162). Multiple personality disorder was not a 
disease lurking in nature waiting to be discovered, but rather had to be invented by 
clinicians and animated by patients. This position does not deny that behaviors 
resembling multiple personality may have existed throughout history. However, it 
asserts that the invention of multiple personality disorder as a real form of being, 
simultaneously created new ways for disturbed people to be, to behave, and to express 
suffering. The clinical label served as verification that certain behaviors were symptoms 
of a disease that required clinical analysis and treatment. Once multiple personality 
disorder was invented, it became a cultural accepted and verified behavior to express 
suffering. 
Acknowledging multiple personality disorder as a recent phenomenon whose 
labeling served to increase its prevalence, does not infer that people who suffer from 
multiple personalities are “making-up” or fabricating their disorder. Instead, there is 
much evidence that multiple personalities are a form of dissociation that serves as a 
coping strategy for childhood sexual abuse. Birrell and Freyd (2013) mention that “if a 
little girl is sexually abused at night, and during the day her family behaves as though 
nothing happened, the little girl must put that knowledge aside in order to stay in her 
family” (p.99). Dissociation serves as a forgetting mechanism; when a child 
unconsciously creates a new personality, it does so to protect its “main” personality 
from the horrors of sexual abuse. For example, Birrell and Freyd describe the story of 
Cathy who “learned to check out from the extreme pain and confusion when her 
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surroundings didn’t support her” (p.100). Cathy continues “the biggest betrayal for me 
was the normalization, that there’s this incredible lie going on, that parents are suppose 
to love you and keep you safe, and in my experience those were the most dangerous 
people” (p.97). Birrell and Freyd add that understanding the mechanisms of dissociation 
“makes us begin to question whether it is a real mental disorder or whether it is a 
normal and creative response to what really is the disorder: the betrayal of intimate and 
what should be loving bonds” (p.99). In any case, once multiple personality disorder 
was a clinically verified disorder brought into public awareness, a label now existed for 
those suffering to latch onto and creatively express their suffering.  
The making-up of schizophrenia shares a similar story. It is likely that states of 
psychosis have existed throughout human history, but whether or not these states were 
beneficial, damaging, extraordinary, or normal has yet to be determined. However, once 
schizophrenia was invented, its label served as clinical verification that psychotic 
experiences were abnormal symptoms of a disease. Psychosis, like dissociation in 
multiple personality disorder, is likely a mechanism of the mind and not an invention. 
However, schizophrenia is an invention that simultaneously created new ways for those 
experiencing psychosis to be, to behave, and to express suffering. Those experiencing 
psychotic episodes were now part of a group of people known as ‘schizophrenics’. 
When an individual is defined by an illness, the connotations attached to the illness are 
simultaneously attached to the individual. The psychiatric domain has moved away 
from using the term ‘schizophrenics’ as the DSM-IV “instead uses the more accurate, 
but admittedly more cumbersome ‘an individual with schizophrenia” (p.xxxi). Despite 
the attempt by the psychiatric domain to reduce stigma using the term ‘with’, the 
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negative connotations of schizophrenia remain attached to the individual ‘with 
schizophrenia’. Being diagnosed with schizophrenia is never likely an enjoyable 
experience for an individual. The heterogeneous nature of psychotic experiences is not 
reflected in the diagnosis of a singular schizophrenic label. How then did the 
schizophrenic label, in a sense, create schizophrenics, and what are the consequences of 
diagnosing an individual with the schizophrenic label? 
Some of these consequences have already been discussed: the increase in 
American asylum patients during the 1870-1950’s, how an unreliable and invalid 
method of diagnosis leads to misdiagnosis, and the profound side-effects of psychotic 
drugs. It is noteworthy to add how these three examples all perpetuate suffering; being 
locked forcefully in an asylum, being misdiagnosed with a stigmatized mental illness, 
and being fed brain-altering medication can all profoundly damage one’s psyche. 
Labeling theory in regards to mental illness was primarily developed by Thomas Scheff 
(1966) who argued that the label of mental illness was both a social construction and a 
social role. Although Scheff originally overlooked some biological and psychological 
factors, his theory has since been revised to include interdisciplinary factors. Scheff 
asserts when an individual is labeled with a mental illness they are placed in a 
stigmatized status, which can lead to relational and institutional discrimination. Further, 
he argues expectations embedded in the illness can act as a social force which pressures 
the labeled individual into unconsciously fulfilling these expectations. Consequently, 
labels serve as a self-fulfilling prophecy, “whereby people have expectations about what 
another is like, which influences how they act toward that person, which causes that 
person to behave consistently with people’s original expectation, making the 
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expectations come true” (Aronson 2010, p.504). Originally, Scheff believed that labels 
can directly cause ‘mental illness’.  
A “modified-labeling theory” was proposed by Link et al. (1989) after they 
conducted an experiment to test Scheff’s theory. Over 500 community residents and 
psychiatric patients were placed in groups and tested on many different variables. The 
results showed that “in the course of being socialized, individuals develop negative 
conceptions of what it means to be a mental patient and thus form beliefs about how 
others will view and then treat someone in that status” (p.419). Modified-labeling 
theory departs from Scheff’s model; “our approach does not assign to labeling the 
power to create mental illness directly. Instead, we view labeling and stigma as possible 
causes of negative outcomes that may place mental patients at risk for the recurrence or 
prolongation of disorders” (p.404). Their results showed a significant relationship 
between labels and withdrawal. Labeling led people to “withdraw from social contacts 
that they perceive as potentially rejecting”, and the researchers add that “such strategies 
can lead to negative consequences for social support networks, jobs, and self-esteem” 
(p.400). Further evidence for modified-labeling theory comes from Wright et al. (2000), 
which ran a 2 year followup study on recently deinstitutionalized patients. The “results 
indicate that social rejection is a persistent source of social stress for the discharged 
patients” and that “these experiences increase feelings of self-deprecation” (p.68). 
Although labels can not directly cause a mental illness, labels can significantly 
influence and damage the psyche of the labeled individual. The problem of labeling is 
complicated further when the label is assumed to be of biological nature. Mehta (1997) 
ran an experiment in which subjects were paired with confederates who were labeled 
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with either a biological mental illness, or a mental illness caused from childhood 
experiences. The results showed that people increased the severity of electric shocks at 
a faster rate to those given a biological label. Mehta explains; 
“If we regard those with mental disorders as sick, we may adopt a 
patronizing attitude toward them. While believing that we ought not to 
blame the afflicted for their failure to measure up, we may also believe 
that people with mental disturbances, like children, must be treated 
firmly. They must be shown how to do things and where they have erred. 
Hence the harsher treatment.” (p.416) 
Critics of labeling theory argue that labels are beneficial because they can guide patients 
toward treatment. However, does labeling actually serve to help determine proper 
methods of treatment, is the label a necessary component of treatment? No, there is no 
singular method of treating schizophrenia because the heterogeneity of psychotic 
experiences requires a variety of treatments personalized toward the specific suffering 
individual. Despite any pragmatic value of labeling, the consequences of labeling 
schizophrenia outweigh any benefits. Labels influence clinicians to focus on eradicating 
behavioral symptoms, while ignoring the life story of the individual. For example, 
according to the criteria of the DSM two individuals could be labeled schizophrenic 
who share no common symptoms. Sometimes what clinicians label as schizophrenia is 
really normal reactions to extreme events such as trauma, other times there may be a 
more organic basis. The variability within psychotic experiences should not be 
subjected to a singular label. To label someone with a biological illness should require 
more evidence than behavioral symptoms; we don’t diagnose cigarette smokers with 
lung cancer without at least looking at their lungs. Evidence has shown that labels not 
only damage the individual, but damage the ability for society to see the individual as 
more than their label. Page (1977) found that “persons identifying themselves as mental 
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patients were refused rooms for rent significantly more often than were persons using 
no mental illness identification” (p.85). Further, Stuart (2006) explores the 
disproportional amount of unemployment effecting the mentally ill. In conclusion, this 
except from Watters (2010) shed light on the effects of naming a disease; 
“Individuals in a given place and time will react to illness similarly, in 
other words, because they share the same limited repertoire of cultural 
scripts for how to play their part. The different ways that cultures 
communicate expectations for behavior are often quite subtle. Seemingly 
small differences, such as the disease’s name, can make a difference. 
Jenkins noticed, for instance, that Mexican American families in 
southern California, who had lower expressed emotion scores than 
Anglo-American families tended to use the term nerviosto describe the 
illness of the relative with schizophrenia…Nervios is a catchall diagnosis 
for feelings of disquiet or distress…Jenkins saw the use of the word was 
part of a strategy by which the family jointly downplayed the gravity of 
the illness. Nervioscarried little of the dire connotations an Anglo-
American would associate with schizophrenia. Nervios, like spirit 
possession, is thought of as a transitory state. This allowed relatives and 
the ill family member to regard periods of remission in a more favorable 
light. This hopeful naming also fostered feelings of empathy. Many of 
the Mexican-American family members in one of Jenkin’s studies told 
her that they too had suffered from nervios, in a milder form, and so 
could empathize with the relative’s distress…The label and its 
connotations allowed family members to keep the relative within the 
fold.” (p.160-1) 
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Chapter 3: Progress through Support and Empowerment/Conclusion 
Ultimately, the concept of schizophrenia and the methods of its treatment can 
perpetuate suffering. If this is true, then the quality and utility of the schizophrenic 
concept should be put into question. The main assumption of this paper, stated in the 
introduction, is that the primary role of the medical system should be to support and 
empower those suffering. How then can the “making-up” of schizophrenia, and all of its 
extensions, be used to empower rather than damage those suffering? 
First, it is necessary to evaluate the current state of crisis within the psychiatric 
paradigm, in order to suggest actions which modify the current schizophrenic model. 
This task is essentially connected to the question of scientific progress which Kuhn so 
deeply investigated. It is important to recognize that Kuhn distinguishes “mature 
sciences” such as physics or biology, from “soft sciences” such as philosophy or 
psychology. This distinction is necessary because mature sciences and soft sciences 
progress uniquely. According to Kuhn, ‘scientific progress’ is a redundant notion 
because progress is an essential characteristic of science; “viewed from within any 
single community, however, whether of scientists or of non-scientists, the result of 
successful creative work is progress” (p.162). He explains that “normally, the members 
of a mature scientific community work from a single paradigm”, and that “the absence 
at most times of competing schools that question each other’s aims and standards makes 
the progress of a normal-scientific community far easier to see” (p.162-3). The progress 
of mature science is easier to see because once a paradigm shift has completed, 
competing schools of thought dissolve and a singular core paradigm serves as the 
foundation for future research. For example, the theory of evolution altered and 
 
 
44 
 
hijacked the paradigm of biology. Although biologists may argue about the details of 
evolutionary theory, it would be challenging for any biologist to see the world in any 
terms other than evolution.  
Progress within soft science is not as straightforward. Kuhn states “if we doubt, 
as many do, that non-scientific fields make progress, that cannot be because individual 
schools make none. Rather, it must be because there are always competing schools, 
each of which constantly questions the very foundations of the others. The man who 
argues that philosophy, for example, has made no progress emphasizes that there are 
still Aristotelians, not that Aristotelianism has failed to progress.” (p.162-3). Although 
here Kuhn groups together non-science with philosophy, it is important to recognize 
that there should be a distinction between non-science and soft science. Kuhn is a bit 
harsh in considering philosophy and psychology as non-science, as both domains utilize 
and benefit from ideas propagated through science. While a single paradigm tends to 
guide mature science, soft sciences are characterized by multiple competing schools of 
thought which debate over fundamentals. The student studying soft science “has 
constantly before him a number of competing and incommensurable solutions to these 
problems, solutions that [they] must ultimately evaluate for [themselves]” (p.165). 
Although soft sciences produce paradigms, a single paradigm is never likely to be 
completely accepted by its scientific community. This is because the questions 
concerning soft sciences tend to be more subjective, and thus more open to 
interpretation. While periods of crisis tend to be rare and dramatic in the progression of 
mature science, soft sciences are characterized somewhat as being in a perpetual state of 
crisis.  
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In the case of the psychiatric paradigm, voices of dissent have continuously 
challenged the paradigm throughout its history. Although the psychiatric paradigm 
never gained universal acceptance, it was accepted by the medical industry. The 
endorsement of the psychiatric paradigm by the medical industry legitimized the 
paradigm in the eyes of the general public, despite that it was never fully accepted by its 
own scientific community. Unfortunately, the paradigm was legitimized prematurely as 
the scientific community never established the basic research necessary to support their 
claims. Basic research is distinct from applied research as basic research describes the 
study of the fundamental aspects of a phenomenon. The development of basic research 
serves as the foundation in which applied research branches off. Applied research 
describes the utilization of basic research to create methods and techniques which 
further contribute to knowledge about a phenomenon.  
For the psychiatric paradigm, basic research primarily focuses around biological 
factors while applied methods primarily involve the classification system (DSM) and 
treatment through pharmaceutical drugs. In the case of schizophrenia, basic research 
should consist of essential facts about the ‘disease’ such as prevalence and form. 
Applied research should consist of treatment and prevention methods. Notice how the 
knowledge of basic research should assist the development of applied methods. 
However, the psychiatric paradigm ignored establishing basic research and skipped to 
developing applied methods. For example, the creation of insane asylums manifested 
without much consensus about what defined insanity. Further, the invention of 
schizophrenia lacked basic evidence, yet much was assumed about the disorder in 
creating treatment methods. Ideally, basic research of a disease should include its form 
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and etiology, but schizophrenia was invented amidst mystery and has remained 
mysterious ever since. Before the development of basic qualities regarding 
schizophrenia, schizophrenia was already assumed to be a legitimate disease entity that 
necessitated medical treatment. By performing applied research without the foundations 
basic research provides, the scientific community attempts to treat schizophrenia 
without a fundamental understanding of what schizophrenia actually means.  
This lack of connection between basic and applied research has dangerous 
implications for those suffering because inadequate basic research becomes the basis for 
diagnoses that may be illegitimate. These diagnoses then necessitate treatment that may 
be inappropriate, but are justified by applied research. Through the process of diagnosis 
and treatment, an individual is affirmed that there is something wrong with them and 
then reduced to becoming the object of study. This affirmation creates a dependent 
relationship between the patient and clinician because the clinician is believed to hold 
the knowledge about how to combat the disease. However, because applied treatments 
of schizophrenia have little basis in basic research, treatment methods  are innately 
limited and may even add to existing problems as is the case with the profound side-
effects of anti-psychotic drugs. Although the clinician tries to help the individual, 
overlooking the disconnect between basic and applied research hinders the clinicians 
ability to properly treat the individual. By acknowledging and addressing this 
disconnect, however, a holistic treatment can be developed that is more focused on the 
individual rather than the poorly-researched disease that the individual may be suffering 
from.  
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The stranglehold of the medical industry over the psychiatric paradigm has 
persisted for far too long. Foundations of the psychiatric paradigm were born 
prematurely through illegitimate methods, but have remained legitimized by the 
medical industry through constant reinterpretation and affirmation. This biomedical 
approach to mental illness creates a profitable financial flow between drug companies 
and psychiatry, making influence over the psychiatric paradigm more than purely 
scientific. Simultaneously, it creates a stigmatized environment that damages the psyche 
of the suffering individual. Although not all aspects of the psychiatric paradigm create 
negative repercussions for those suffering, enough core assumptions and methods 
damage the individual which reveals the necessity of creating scientific progress 
through paradigm reconstruction. Unlike the problems facing mature sciences, the 
problems facing the psychiatric paradigm deal directly with human suffering which is 
always in need of urgent attention and progress. Basic research is important but because 
those suffering are in need of urgent treatment, ultimately the most important job of the 
mental health profession is to enhance applied treatment methods. If schizophrenia was 
merely an invalid term, it could still have utility within the psychiatric realm. However, 
schizophrenia is not only invalid, but the term itself stigmatizes and damages the 
individual. Progress requires interdisciplinary communication among many more 
factors. I do not have the expertise or time to describe complete paradigm 
reconstruction. However, I will explore psychosocial approaches to reconstructing 
schizophrenia, which serve to empower rather than damage those suffering from 
psychotic experiences. 
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International Society for Psychological and Social Approaches to Psychosis 
The perpetual state of crisis has forced dissenters to work within the paradigm 
they defy. This is because insurance for treatment requires a DSM diagnosis. Although 
dissenters may not agree with the diagnostic system, they understand that those 
suffering require support and that they must work within the current system in order to 
help. One important dissenting organization is the International Society for 
Psychological and Social Approaches to Psychosis (ISPS). During the last few months, 
I have attended a number of events put on by the Eugene chapter of ISPS. In this next 
section, I will describe the alternative approaches to schizophrenia emphasized by ISPS. 
Ultimately, since assumptions are made that negatively impact the individual suffering 
with schizophrenia, and because the basis of the disease itself is questionable, this 
questions the utility of the disease. This is not meant to discredit the individual suffering 
from psychotic experiences, but rather to empower them that they are not alone in their 
suffering, as many people experience psychosis who are able to successfully recover. 
ISPS was created in 1956 and expanded to the United States in 1998 “to go 
beyond a biological-reductionist orientation and to gain a psychoanalytic understanding 
of the complexity of psychosis” (p.1). Their mission listed on their website consists of 5 
key claims: 
1) Promote the appropriate use of psychotherapy and psychosocial treatments 
for those suffering from psychosis 
2) Support treatment that include individual, family, group and milieu 
approaches and treatment methods that are derived from psychoanalysis, 
cognitive-behavioral, systemic, psycho-educational, peer support and related 
approaches 
3) Advance education, training and knowledge of mental health professionals 
in the psychological therapies and psychosocial interventions in the 
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treatment and prevention of psychosis for the public benefit regardless of 
race, religion, gender orientation, or socioeconomic status 
4) Promote personal empowerment as a necessary part of recovery from 
psychosis  
5) Promote research into individual, family, and group psychological therapies, 
preventative measures and other psychosocial programs for those with 
psychosis 
These claims highlight the necessity to have an adaptable approach to therapy. Since 
there is high variability within psychotic experiences, different individuals will require 
different methods of treatment. It is important not only to analyze the psychotic 
experiences of the individual, but also to understand the life story and context of the 
individual, as this can often reveal true sources of suffering which may be influencing 
psychotic experiences. The job of the clinician is not to simply diagnose diseases, but to 
listen and understand the individual in order to provide the proper support. Working 
closely with ISPS member and private therapist Ron Unger, I have been able to witness 
firsthand the differences between the typical approach to therapy and alternative 
approaches. Typically, therapy consists of circular logic which in effect stagnates or 
even increases suffering (see Figure 1). First, a patient comes into the clinicians office 
looking for an explanation for these weird experiences they have had. Next, the 
clinician asks questions based off of diagnostic criteria which assures that these 
experiences are caused by an illness, schizophrenia. Then, the patient wonders how the 
clinician knows they have an illness called schizophrenia. Finally, the clinician replies 
that they can diagnose you with schizophrenia because you have had these weird 
experiences. Consequently, the patient may leave more confused about their 
experiences than when they arrived. They are now affirmed they have a biological 
disease, which is best treated by eradicating symptoms through anti-psychotic drugs. 
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 Ron Unger takes a drastically different approach to his job. For Unger, the role 
of the therapist is not to simply be an expert who diagnoses behaviors and provides 
medication. Instead, the role of the therapist should be collaborative rather than 
authoritative. The therapist is an empathetic fellow human being, who also experiences 
the universal condition of human suffering, and should work together with the patient in 
creating a path to recovery. Since people suffering from psychotic experiences often 
have trouble maintaining meaningful relationships, the therapist is inclined to provide a 
nurturing and compassionate relationship with the patient. Focusing on behavioral 
symptoms of a hypothesized disease will blind the clinician from the bigger picture of 
the individual. One key aspect of all therapies should be to instill in the individual a 
sense of hope that they have the ability to recover. Treatments should go beyond simply 
trying to eradicate symptoms, and instead attention should be given to observable 
factors that either strengthen or weaken suffering. Further, the patient should be assured 
that their experiences are really not quite that different from what is designated as 
normal experiences. By opening up about his own experiences with mental 
disturbances, Ron assures the patient they are not alone in their suffering. 
 Ron Unger’s story, which in some sense is shared by many others suffering from 
psychosis, reveals how psychotic experiences can become a source of empowerment. 
Ron Unger’s journey to becoming a therapist developed during his childhood when he 
experienced early trauma. As mentioned earlier stress, trauma, and intense emotional 
tenor of families are all related to later psychosis. Ron explains on his webpage “as do 
many traumatized children, I internalized much of the oppression, resulting in a 
defective identity and difficulty making social connections” (p.1). Luckily, Ron began 
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to form relationships in college with like-minded people who “saw it as a possible 
positive journey” (p.1). This led him to find work with organizations that worked 
against the mental health system. However, Ron mentions that he was the lucky one 
because although the basic outline of their journey was the same, “many of his siblings 
did not fare as well” (p.1). This excerpt from Ron expresses how he gained 
empowerment by working with people he could relate too that were often mistreated by 
others; 
“What motivated me was the understanding that people similar to myself 
(including my own siblings) were being misinformed about what they 
were going through by a system that failed to understand the process, by 
a system that saw only bad in a process that I knew from my own 
personal experience could also be good.  The “treatments” that were then 
given were ones that suppressed the person along with the problem, and 
that didn’t open any doors to real healing, or even imagine that it was 
possible.” (p.1) 
When Ron became a certified therapist along with being a mental health reform 
advocate, he made it his mission to address common misconceptions about psychosis in 
order to develop effective and human treatment methods. Ron emphasizes the 
importance of treating patients on a case by case basis. The variability of psychotic 
experiences requires that therapists have adaptable treatment methods that can be 
tailored to specific individuals. Further, the therapist should not add stress to the 
patients condition, so using supportive discourse is also of great importance. In his 
handout on common misconceptions of schizophrenia, Ron discusses the differences 
between his perspective and the common perspective. First, he addresses the common 
belief that schizophrenia is a brain disease. He mentions that “supposed brain 
differences are very commonly found in persons not diagnosable with schizophrenia”, 
and “while biological differences influence vulnerability to psychotic symptoms, 
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probably anyone could have such symptoms given the right set of experiences” (p.1). 
Next, he addresses the common misconception that schizophrenia is a chronic and 
degenerative disease. He states that “long term outcome studies show most people 
recover at least somewhat, and many people make a full recovery” (p.1). He adds 
“psychotic symptoms may cease at any time, whoever the factors that perpetuate them 
are modified” (p.1). Finally, he addresses the common misconception that medication 
should be the primary tool to alleviate psychosis. However, “adding more or different 
medication often just adds more harmful side effects without much or any increase in 
effectiveness” (p.2). Further, “effective therapy can often reduce psychotic symptoms, 
resulting in less medication being used and so fewer harmful side effects” (p.3). After 
creating a safe environment in which the suffering individually feels they can safely 
express themselves, Unger can then begin to start treating sources of suffering. These 
next two sections will describe progressive and effective treatment methods for 
psychotic experiences. 
Acute and Expansive Treatment Methods 
By working with ISPS and Ron Unger, I have been able to learn about treatment 
methods for psychosis which aim to empower rather than damage the individual. The 
biological explanation for mental illness can make the patient think that recovery is out 
of their control, recovery is up to biology. However, many survivors of psychotic 
experiences have been able to fully recover through personal and social coping 
strategies. When speaking about contributions to mental health knowledge, Read et al. 
(2004) argues that “what is surprising is the almost total absence of the voices of those 
who have most direct experience of schizophrenia” (p.148). Currently, professionals in 
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the mental health system hold all the knowledge and power, and are expected to have a 
better understanding and explanation of what is going on with the suffering individual. 
Restricting the voices of those suffering limits empowerment of the individual, and 
limits scientific progress. This is especially true for schizophrenia because one of its 
main symptoms is hearing voices, which clinicians refuse to try to understand but rather 
attempt to eradicate. If progress is to be made in the psychiatric paradigm, then this 
requires that patient’s themselves start playing a more prominent and meaningful role 
within research and practice. To understand “madness” we must first listen to 
“madness”.  
 This section will explore two different levels of treatment methods, acute and 
expansive. Acute treatment methods refer to those which involve a specific individual 
suffering. Expansive methods refer to treatments which act at a broader scale. Both 
methods are critical in the attempt to support and empower those suffering from 
psychosis. First let’s investigate acute treatments. One of the most prevalent and 
bothersome symptoms of psychosis is hearing auditory hallucinations, most of the time 
in the form of voices. Hearing voices that appear to come from outside one’s 
consciousness can be a confusing or even traumatic experience for anyone. However, 
there is not such a fine line between “normal” voices and those which are defined as 
pathological. Many “normal” people frequently experience involuntary thoughts or even 
get songs stuck in their head. Mirowsky (1990) found that the subjective boundary for 
diagnoses “remain[s] arbitrary” and that while “most people do not have, or rarely have, 
most of the symptoms, everyone has some of them, and every symptom is experienced 
frequently by at least some people.” (p.407-20). As children we are told to use our 
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imaginations and to even play with imaginary friends. Yet once we arrive to adulthood, 
things we seem to imagine are no longer socially acceptable and can even be defined as 
a symptom of a disease. However, hearing voices does not have to be seen as a 
symptom necessitating eradication, as many new approaches actually encourage voice 
hearers to build relationships with their voices.  
 The Hearing Voices Network (HVN) is a major organization that advocates for 
mental health reform specifically in regards to voice hearing. The prevalence and 
variability of voice hearers is acknowledge by the HVN on their website; 
“For some, these experiences can be comforting. For example, someone 
who is lonely may really value a voice that becomes a trusted confidant. 
A person who has recently lost someone they care about may benefit 
from talking to them at the end of the day, or smelling their 
perfume/aftershave. Others find these experiences to be a source of 
inspiration. Authors, for example, sometimes talk about how the 
characters can come to life and write the story for them. However, for 
some people these voices and visions can be extremely distressing – 
criticizing, threatening or causing confusion.” (Voices and Visions, p.1) 
For some, voice hearing can be a positive and creative experience. However for others, 
voices can become highly criticizing making the individual highly distressed. Their 
approach to hearing voices is described by this excerpt from the HVN; 
“Hearing voices has been regarded by psychiatry as ‘auditory 
hallucinations’, and in many cases a symptom of schizophrenia. 
However not everyone who hears voices has a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia. There are conflicting theories from psychiatrists, 
psychologists and voice hearers about why people do hear voices. We 
believe that they are similar to dreams, symbols of our unconscious 
minds. Although the Network is open to many diverse opinions we 
accept the explanation of each individual voice hearer. Traditionally, the 
usual treatment for voice hearing has been major tranquilizers, 
administered to reduce the delusions and hallucinations. However not 
everyone responds to this treatment. There are some psychiatrists and 
psychologists who now work with people who hear voices using talking 
therapies and exploring the meaning of the voices. Although this is not 
 
 
55 
 
yet ‘the norm’, this practice is increasing. As the improvement in 
individuals who are encouraged to talk about their voices becomes more 
apparent and increasing number of health professionals are beginning to 
understand that the key to understanding voices lies in the ‘content’ of 
the voices.” (About HVN, p.1) 
Ron Unger’s approach is influenced by the HVN. Unger affirms his patients that he is 
not trying to change or get rid of any of their voices. Instead of trying to eradicate the 
voices, Unger attempts to mend the relationship between the individual and the voices 
they hear. He has noticed that many of the distressing voices heard by patients serve as 
metaphors for past experiences. For example, patients hearing voices such as “you’re 
not good enough”, are linked to having highly critical family members. Unger also 
claims that distressing voices can be linked to moments of present stress. Being 
conscious of one’s stress is the first step towards relieving the stress. There have been 
many coping strategies developed for people to deal with distressing voices. Depending 
on the individual and the voices, certain coping strategies can be more effective. Part of 
all coping strategies is to develop a compassionate voice which serves to talk and 
consult with distressing voices. Some strategies that Unger has used effectively include 
being kind to the distressing voice, deliberately focusing on the distressing voice, 
setting specific times for one’s compassionate voice to speak with distressing voices, 
not taking voices literally, reframing hostile voices as helping one get in touch with 
difficult feelings, and so on. Most importantly, rather than eradicating voices through 
medication which doesn't solve the deeper problems represented through voices, other 
strategies can be utilized that address voices as important parts of the make-up of the 
individual, which must be worked with rather than suppressed. 
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 Another acute treatment method developed by Paul Gilbert (2009) is referred to 
as compassion-focused therapy. Gilbert defines the essence of compassion as “a basic 
kindness, with deep awareness of the suffering of oneself and of other living things, 
coupled with the wish and effort to relieve it” (p. xiii). It is not only the therapists job to 
be compassionate, but also to instill in the patient a sense of self-compassion. Gilbert’s 
adds that “people with high levels of shame and self-criticism can have enormous 
difficulty in being kind to themselves” (p.199). This led Gilbert to explore affect 
regulation systems that enable individuals to feel content and safe. Gilbert’s model of 
affect regulation systems (see figure 2) includes three major affect systems which 
simultaneously influence each other: threat focused, incentive/resource focused, and 
affiliative/soothing focused. Healthy individuals are thought to strike a balance between 
the three systems. Although Gilbert recognizes this is not the only way affect systems 
can be conceptualized, it “offers a useful heuristic for clinical thinking” (p.200). The 
compassion-focused model hypothesizes that the affiliative/soothing system “is poorly 
accessible in people with high shame and self-criticism, in whom the threat affect 
regulation system dominates orientation in their inner and outer worlds” (p.199). For 
example, “early life events may have sensitized the individuals threat protection system, 
leading to safety strategies that can operate automatically, as conditioned and perhaps 
conflicting responses” (p.200). Thus, the role of the therapist in compassion-focused 
therapy is to strengthen the damaged soothing affect system, in order to create a balance 
between all three systems. 
Gilbert lists three aspects of compassionate therapeutic engagement: 
1) The therapist uses the skills and expresses the attributes of compassion 
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2) The client experiences their interaction with the therapist as one that is de-
shaming, compassionate and safe; ideally, the client will experience each of 
the attributes and skills of compassion in, and from, the therapist 
3) The therapist helps the client to develop compassionate attributes and skills 
directed at the self 
Evidence for this model is still in its infancy, however the current evidence seems 
highly promising. An experiment conducted by Mayhew and Gilbert (2008) practiced 
compassion focused therapy on a group of psychotic voice hearers. The results showed 
that “all participants’ auditory hallucinations became less malevolent, less persecuting, 
and more reassuring” (p.113). This shows how compassion-focused therapy reduces the 
hostility of voices heard during psychosis, which is an important step towards building a 
productive relationship with one’s voices. Developing a sense of self-compassion and 
strengthening one’s soothing affect system is highly important for the mental health of 
an individual. In the highly stressful environment we live in today, it is more important 
than ever to dedicate time for soothing one’s mind.  
 The final acute treatment method to be discussed was developed by Jean Baker-
Miller and advanced by Comstock et al. (2008). This form of therapy, known as 
relational-cultural theory, “is grounded in the idea that healing takes place in the context 
of mutually empathetic, growth-fostering relationships” (p.279). Continuing, “in an 
effort to create such relationships, the RCT approach to counseling involves identifying 
and deconstructing obstacles to mutuality that individuals encounter in diverse 
relational contexts and networks” (p.279). This approach asserts that growth-fostering 
relationships serve as healing mechanisms towards mental health. Consequently, RCT 
assumes “that the experiences of isolation, shame, humiliation, oppression, 
marginalization, and micro aggressions are relational violations and traumas that are at 
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the core of human suffering” (p.280). This contributes to what the researchers describe 
as the central relational paradox; assuming all individuals experience the desire for 
social inclusion, “in the face of yearning for connection, which inevitably produces a 
heightened sense of vulnerability, individuals use strategies that result in further 
disconnection and isolation. Such strategies are commonly used to avoid perceived or 
real risks of hurt, rejection, and other forms of relational disconnection, social 
exclusion, and marginalization” (p.282). Therefore, it is the therapist’s duty to 
understand the context of the individual in relation to their close relationships and 
culture, in order to empower the individual towards maintaining and building growth-
fostering relationships.  
 Growth-fostering relationships are characterized by many attributes. Miller 
(1976) listed five major attributes: 
1) Each person feels a greater sense of zest (vitality, energy) 
2) Each person feels more able to act and does act in the world 
3) Each person has a more accurate picture of her/himself and the other 
person 
4) Each person feels a greater sense of worth 
5) Each person feels more connected to other persons and exhibits a 
greater motivation to connect with other people beyond those in 
one’s primary relationships 
Therapy for an individual with psychosis can go far beyond discussing psychotic 
experiences. The therapist should create a growth fostering relationship between 
themselves and the patient, then support the patient in seeking and building growth-
fostering relationships outside therapy. Further, because those with psychosis hear 
voices, they should be encouraged to create growth-fostering relationships between 
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themselves and their voices. The road to recovery is much easier and empowering when 
an individual is not alone in their suffering.  
 Expansive treatment methods are also crucial in progressing the empowerment 
of those experiencing psychosis. Again, expansive methods refer to treatments that act 
to empower psychosis at a broader level. Two expansive methods will be discussed: 
user-run services and educational programs. User-run services for psychosis refer to 
services that are created and operated by those who experience or have recovered from 
psychosis. These services can take many forms such as support groups, drop-in centers, 
advocacy programs, teaching services, and so on. Read et al. (2004) mentions how 
“when consumers/survivors come together, they often identify critical needs that are 
largely unmet in traditional mental health programming” (p.283). User-run services can 
act as a platform to build growth-fostering relationships, especially because the 
individuals have experienced and can relate to similar forms of suffering. Herman 
(1992) describes how Vietnam veterans created “rap groups” which “retold and relived 
the traumatic experiences of war” (p.26-7). Since Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder was 
not invented yet, these trauma survivors found support and comfort through each other. 
This reflects how many people affected by trauma or psychosis find peace and recovery 
through making connections with others affected by the same trauma or experience. By 
working with similar people who at the same time advocate and provide support for the 
common source of suffering, user-run services can themselves be a form of therapy and 
empowerment.  
 Lastly, another expansive method for advancing the treatment of schizophrenia 
is educational programs. In order for a safe and empowering environment to be created, 
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it will take more than purely the efforts of the psychiatric domain, but also the efforts of 
the general public. The misconceptions about psychosis within the general public helps 
foster a regressive environment for those who experience psychosis. Although the 
original goal of mental health literacy was to reduce stigma, the biological framework 
has had the opposite effect of creating a more stigmatized environment. Watters (2010) 
asserts that it is important to recognize “which cultural beliefs tend to exclude the 
sufferer from the social group and which allow the ill individual to remain part of the 
group” (p.176). The goal of educational programs should be to help reinstate the 
individual suffering from psychosis into the social group of all individuals. Educational 
programs can be introduced into the education system, as well as into the media via 
internet, television, and newspapers. Mental health awareness should not serve to create 
a distinction between those who are mentally stable and those who have difficulties, but 
rather bring about the awareness that mental health affects everyone, individually and 
collectively. People should not be discouraged to talk about feelings of neglect, shame, 
or humiliation because ignoring these difficult feelings often leads to a spiral of 
additional problems. Educational programs can provide those with difficult feelings the 
resources to deal with those feelings in a supportive and empowering way. In regards to 
psychosis, educational programs can destroy the misconception that psychosis is a rare 
biological syndrome. Further, educational programs can challenge the general public to 
rethink their understanding of psychosis, normality, and insanity. Understanding that 
those who experience psychosis have far fewer differences and far more similarities 
with those who do not experience psychosis, is an important first step in reintegrating 
those with psychosis back into the community. 
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Need for Revolution/Conclusion 
This exploration into the construct of schizophrenia has been a transforming 
experience. A summary of research has shown that schizophrenia can not be simply 
understood as a biological disease expressed by certain behavioral symptoms. The 
categorization and simplification of psychotic experiences do not reflect the expansive 
and convoluted factors contributing to psychosis.  
Part One of this paper concludes that the modern making-up of schizophrenia is 
based in little scientific validity. Further, the classification system along with the 
dependence on anti-psychotic drugs creates an environment that perpetuates suffering. 
Part Two explores criticisms of the psychiatric paradigm, which serves to reveal why 
the psychiatric paradigm is in a state of crisis that must be resolved. Finally, Part Three 
supplies progressive treatment methods that serve to empower rather than damage those 
suffering. Progress within the realm of psychosis depends on the empowerment and 
reconstruction of those suffering from psychosis. If the psychiatric domain wishes to 
progress, then it can start by acknowledging and transforming the areas in which it has 
failed. 
Human beings are deeply embedded within the ubiquitous nature of suffering. 
Suffering constitutes a fundamental element of the human condition, which heavily 
influences the individual’s course. One could imagine asserting, I suffer therefore I am. 
Humans are not the only organisms to experience suffering, but the complexities of 
human sociability and language certainly produces an emergent layer of mediation that 
suffering latches onto. Socially for example, suffering is now partly mediated through 
trauma or neglect. Human brains were not necessarily adapted to deal with suffering 
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stemming from the complexities of today’s world. Further, the individual suffering or in 
pain is likely to be captivated by that source. Although suffering can never be 
completely eradicated, if people wish to ease the suffering of today’s world, then 
solutions to causes and ramifications of suffering must be further investigated in both 
academia and the working-sector. However, any investigation into suffering requires the 
integration of those suffering rather than exclusion.  
In regards to schizophrenia, it must be acknowledged that to label someone with 
a disease requires more evidence than purely behavioral symptoms. The medical field 
must realize that a history of over-diagnosis and misdiagnosis creates ramifications, 
which harm the individual’s ability to recover. Through investigating schizophrenia, we 
see that the current state of America’s mental health system reinforces assumptions that 
are damaging to suffering individuals. If receiving a diagnosis damages an individual’s 
self-esteem and well-being, then the diagnostic system perpetuates suffering. Further, 
biological drugs are not the proper solution as they often create dependence and 
additional problems.  
It is important to treat patients on a case-by-case basis because life experiences 
of the individual influence suffering and play a significant role in the road to recovery. 
Reducing psychosis to biology ignores how life experiences can often shape the 
psychosis. However, biological vulnerabilities and sensitivities matched with an 
overstimulated threat-affect system due to continued stress or trauma are likely to be the 
sources of many psychoses. In order for research and treatment methods to progress, 
psychiatrists must quit hastily diagnosing behaviors, focus on enhancing techniques to 
find the true source of suffering, and create a safe environment through compassion and 
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relationships to empower those suffering. Ultimately, if we wish to properly treat 
psychosis, the psychiatric paradigm must be revolutionized to create structures that 
empower those suffering on the achievable road to recovery. 
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